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ARGUMENT

I.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The law regarding summary judgment is clear. If there are genuine issues of
material fact, summary judgment may not be granted. Rule 56, Utah R. Civ. Pro. When
faced with a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all facts including all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.

Forsberg v. Bovis Lend Lease,

Inc., 2008 UT App 146, % 7, 184 P.3d 610. Further, Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah R. Civ. Pro
states, "A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may
contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute." The rules specifically
contemplate the potential to create a genuine issue of material fact through the provision
of a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. In the instant action, Brighton Title
did not dispute the facts alleged by Cooper. It did however present a separate statement
of additional facts in dispute which created a genuine issue of material fact which
precluded the grant of summary judgment.
Brighton Title submitted the Hansen Contract which revealed Cooper was not in
title to the property. (R. 488-501). This created a genuine issue of material fact
concerning whether Cooper had any interest in the property and moreover an interest
which gave rise to the right to sell the property to Deseret Sky.
Brighton Title submitted the affidavit of Richard Peter Stevens, former Assistant
Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Department who explained the nature of Insurance
6

Department Bulletins and the sanctions or enforcement which can spring from the
violations of said bulletins. (R. 560-563). Mr. Stevens averred it was industry standard
and practice to comply with the bulletins. In addition, Brighton Title presented the
affidavit of Jeff Gorringe who stated on June 1, 2008, he informed Metro National Title
Deseret Sky would not close on the transaction because Cooper was not in title. (R. 566569). This constituted an objection before the June 8, 2007 deadline. Gorringe informed
Metro National Title unless Cooper provided a full assignment of the Hansen contract or
provided assurances Cooper would close the transaction with its own funds, Brighton
Title would not participate in this illegal flip transaction. (R. 566-567).
Brighton Title presented the affidavit of Matt Sager the underwriting counsel for
Stewart Guaranty Company (R. 570-574). He specifically reviewed the transaction and
found it to be an illegal flip transaction. (R. 572). Brighton Title's underwriter refused to
insure the transaction.
Cooper asserted a contractual claim in the Property which it believed provided the
legal basis to sell the Property. (R. 532-541). It did not provide any evidence to the
Court of a present ability to obtain title prior to the closing of the Deseret Sky sale. Thus,
there was a question of fact concerning whether Cooper had any practical ability to obtain
title during the executory period without violating Utah law. This alone precluded the
grant of summary judgment. While Brighton did not dispute the factual allegations
presented by Cooper, it did present additional facts which created a genuine issue of
material fact which precluded the grant of summary judgment.

n
7

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING A FORFEITURE OF THE
EARNEST MONEY
At its core, the trial court's summary judgment is a forfeiture of the earnest money
which was on deposit. This forfeiture was based on Deseret Sky's alleged failure to
timely cancel the real estate purchase contract. Pursuant to the REPC, Deseret Sky had
until June 8, 2007 to cancel the contract. (R. 280-289). On June 1, 2007, Jeff Gorringe
contacted Metro National Title and informed Metro National, Cooper's escrow agent,
Deseret Sky would not close on the transaction because Cooper was not in title. (R. 556567). On June 11, 2007, Deseret Sky sent a letter to Robert Cooper terminating the
REPC. (R. 200, 431).
In Utah, it is clear the law abhors forfeiture. See e.g. Madsen v. Anderson, 667
P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1983). Yet this is precisely what the trial court ordered based on the
failure to strictly comply with the termination provision of the contract, despite the timely
oral notice provided to Cooper's escrow agent and the subsequent written notice to
Cooper. This is particularly problematic where the Seller, Cooper, was never in title to
the property. Like the wheel of fortune, Cooper who never owned the property stands to
profit from the failed sale of property which it never owned.
Other jurisdictions similarly abhor a forfeiture. In Armstrong, Gibbons v.
Southridge Inv., 589 A.2d 836 (R.L 1991), the case involved the purchase of an
apartment complex where $100,000.00 had been deposited in escrow. The Court held
that where oral notice was timely given, but the written confirmation of that oral notice
was untimely, it would not order a forfeiture, regardless of the contract language which
required notices be in writing.
8

Obviously, the purpose of the notice requirement is it insures the party is
informed. See e.g. Vole, Inc. v. Georgacopoulos, 181 111. App.3d 1012, 1019 (1989).
There is no dispute that Cooper was informed.
The equities simply weigh against a forfeiture in the instant action. As a matter
of public policy, a person who never owns a parcel of real property but nonetheless sells
it to another, should not benefit from a liquidated damages provision which results in a
forfeiture of the earnest money when they are on actual notice from the escrow company
that unless Cooper provided assurances they could close the transaction and get on title,
Deseret Sky was terminating the transaction.

in
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING
BRIGHTON TITLE WAS NOT BOUND TO FOLLOW THE INSURANCE
DEPARTMENT'S BULLETINS
The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling Brighton Title was not bound to
follow the Utah Department of Insurance Bulletins. Brighton Title believes the trial court
erred as a matter of law in concluding both that Brighton Title was not obligated to
comply with the Bulletins and its compliance therewith did not excuse its performance
under the terms of the REPC. Further, even if the insurance bulletin does not have the
force of law, this Court should adopt a good faith exception to liability where the title
company's behavior comports with the insurance department's bulletins which interpret
the law.
Utah has adopted the good funds statute, as set forth in Section 31 A-23a-406, Utah
Code Annotated (1953 as amended). Essentially, this statute requires in part that funds
9

be cleared before they can disburse. On or about January 30, 2007, D. Kent Michie, Utah
Insurance Commissioner, issued Bulletin 2007-1, thereby interpreting the above
referenced statute as it relates to prohibited escrow settlement closings. (R. 543).
Bulletin 2007-1 provides the insurance department's interpretation of the good
funds statute. The bulletin specifically informs title agencies when a transaction is illegal
in violation of Section 31 A-23a-406. Pursuant to the express language of the bulletin, it
states, "the Utah Insurance Commissioner and the Title and Escrow Commission have
determined the following structure to be the only permitted method of acting as escrow
wherein the same parcel of property is purchased and then immediately sold." (R. 543).
Based on the good funds statute, as interpreted by the Insurance Department, only if the
transaction follows the approved structure may a Utah licensed title insurance agency act
as escrow for the transaction.
The instant transaction expressly and squarely fit within the description of flip
transactions which are not permitted and violated UCA Section 31 A-23a-406. As such,
the contract between Cooper and Deseret Sky was illegal under the good funds statute.
Illegal contracts or those which offend public policy are void ab initio. See e.g.Ockey v.
Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 189 P.3d 51. In the instant case, the contract between Cooper and
Deseret Sky was illegal and void ab initio. Therefore, the REPC was simply
unenforceable against any party.
The REPC clearly violated Utah Code Annotated Section 31 A-23a-406.
Because it was an illegal transaction, the REPC was unenforceable. The insurance
bulletin clarified the illegality of such transactions by setting forth a graphic example of
10

those transactions in which the department's licensees may or may not participate in as an
escrow agent. Brighton Title, as a licensed escrow agent and title insurance producer,
complied with the law by not participating in an illegal transaction. Brighton Title
further complied with the insurance department's interpretation of the good funds statute.
It was plain error for the trial court to hold it liable for Brighton Title's unwillingness to
participate in an illegal transaction which clearly violated public policy within the State
of Utah was evidenced by the legislative enactment of the good funds statute.
Assuming arguendo this Court finds the insurance department bulletin does not
have the force of law(i), this Court should adopt a good faith exception to liability based
on compliance with the Insurance Department's interpretation of Utah's good funds
statute. Regardless of whether the insurance department bulletins have the force of law,
they directly govern the manner in which the industry conducts its business. Title
insurance producers are expected to and do conform their behavior to the bulletins in
order to keep their conduct in align with the expectations of the insurance department.^)
As such, this Court should as a matter of public policy adopt a good faith exception to
liability where the title insurance producer complies with the department interpretations
of the law.
Utah provides a number of exceptions to liability based on good faith. Good faith
exceptions from liability exist for example in the following circumstances: (a) reporting
child abuse (UCA §62A-4a-410(l)); (b) participation in peer review committees (42 USC

1 This is Cooper's red herring because it is the violation of the good funds statute which renders the transaction
illegal, the contract void ab initio, unenforceable, and prevented Brighton Title from participating in the transaction.
2 Title insurance producers are not an isolated group when it comes to this paradigm. For example, attorneys,
physicians, engineers, architects and many other professions are governed by similar rules of conduct.
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§11112(a) and SLW/Utah, Brinton v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 973 P.2d 956 (Utah 1998)); and
(c) good Samaritan medical intervention (UCA §41-6-31). In each circumstance, the public
policy and benefit furthered by good faith compliance outweighs the individualized
potential for damage thereby resulting in the exemption from liability.
There is substantial precedent for good faith exceptions in other contexts. By
way of example, in Missouri, one who procures an injunction in good faith is exempt
from liability flowing from that injunction. See e.g. State ex rel. Shannon County v.
Chilton, 626 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Mo.App. 1981). In California, a trustee is exempt from
liability for his good faith reliance on information provided to him by the beneficiary.
See e.g. Kachlon v. Markowitz, 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (2008). There
is a good faith exemption from liability for organ donation removal without genuine
consent. See e.g. Ramirez v. Health Partners of Southern Arizona, 193 Ariz. 325, 972
P.2d 658 (App. 1998). In each circumstance, the public policy and benefit furthered by
good faith compliance outweighs the individualized potential for damage thereby
resulting in the exemption from liability.
A good faith exception to liability for reliance on the department's statutory
interpretation is consistent with the reality of governmental administrative operations. As
stated in Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 107 Utah 24, 151 P.2d 467 (1944):

The nature of the administrative process in executing a statutory scheme requires
that administrative agencies not only determine the administrative questions
involved, but apply the law in the first instance as well — that is, that they also
venture an initial decision on the judicial questions. Otherwise, as a practical
matter, the agencies could not function.

12

Id. at 31. The Court went on to acknowledge that when an administrative agency
interprets a statute, that interpretation is not binding upon the Court. However, the Utah
Hotel court favorably quoted a law review article which stated,
Some if not the majority of the regulations issued under most regulatory acts are
interpretive. Such regulations express the views of the administrative officer or
agency as to the meaning or application of general requirements of a regulatory
act, the construction that will be followed in administering the act. Interpretive
regulations (except where they have been 'ratified1 by Congress) have validity in
judicial proceedings only to the extent that they correctly construe the statute and
then, strictly speaking, it is the statute and not the regulation to which the
individual must conform.
Id. at 36 quoting Lee in 29 Geo. L.J. 1. In the instant action, the insurance department
bulletins do exactly that, express the view of the agency as to the meaning and
application of Utah's good funds statute, interpreting and insuring title insurers conform
their conduct to the statute, and the bulletin's interpretation of the statute.
When an insurance licensee conforms its conduct to the agency's interpretation of statute,
it should not be subject to liability for such conduct.
In the instant case, Cooper entered into a contract to purchase the Property from
Hansen. (R. 488-502). Thereafter, without closing on title, Cooper entered into a Real
Estate Purchase Contract to sell the property to Deseret Sky. (R. 2, 198, 231, 280-289).
However, Cooper at all times intended to use part of the sale proceeds received from
Deseret Sky to complete the purchase of the property from Hansen. (R. 551-52). As
such, the transaction was expressly a flip which the Department of Insurance stated was
prohibited by Section 31A-23a-406, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) as
interpreted by the Department in Bulletin 2007-1. Despite Brighton Title's recognition of
the illegal nature of the transaction and its compliance with the administrative agency's
13

interpretation of the good funds statute, nonetheless the trial court found it liable for its
unwillingness to participate in a transaction which has been declared illegal by statute
and illegal by the department's interpretation of that statute. Such liability flies in the
face of the very public policy which rendered such transactions illegal.
Compliance with a Utah Department of Insurance Bulletin should not provide a
basis for a monetary judgment. As stated by the Court in Underwood v. State, 439 So.2d
125 (Ala. 1983) in discussing the effect of an advisory opinion, "Such an opinion has the
effect of protecting such person to whom it is directed from liability . . . because of any
official action or actions performed as directed or advised in such opinion.11 Id. at 128.
In the instant circumstance, Brighton Title was prudent and followed the admonition of
the agency charged with providing interpretations of the law to members of the industry.
By so doing, it should be protected from liability for that compliance. The trial court
erred by finding otherwise.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING IN THE CONTEXT OF A
SPLIT CLOSING A TITLE COMPANY OWES A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO BOTH
PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTION ESPECIALLY WHEN THE
TRANSACTION IS ILLEGAL
In rendering its summary judgment ruling, the trial court concluded that Brighton
Title breached as fiduciary duty owed to Cooper. While generally, a title company acting
as escrow agent owes a fiduciary duty to both parties to the transaction, in the case of a
split closing involving a separately retained title agent, the general rule should not apply.
In the instant action, Cooper elected the transaction close as a "split closing" which
means the buyer engages its own title company and the seller engages a different title
14

company. The trial court held in this context, each title company owes a fiduciary duty to
both parties to the transaction.
Generally, the rule is an escrow agent owes a duty to both parties to the
transaction. Freegard v. First W. Nat'I Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987); Hertz v.
Nordic Ltd., Inc., 761 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1988). The scope of that duty is defined
by the escrow instructions. See e.g. Markowitz v. Fidelity Nat, 142 Cal.App.4th 508, 527,
48 Cal. Rptr.3d 217 (2006). However, the escrow agent does not owe a duty to third
partieswith whom it has no contract. See e.g. Summit Financial Holdings, Ltd. v.
Continental Lawyers Title Co., 41 P.3d 548, 449, 552 (Cal. 2002).
In the instant illegal flip transaction, there were two separate transactions. As
interpreted by Bulletin 2007-5, a split escrow occurs when two parties to a real property
transaction conduct their own portion of the escrow using two separate title producers.
(R. 683-684). By so doing, it creates two separate transactions, each of which must
comply with all of the requirements of an escrow as set forth in UCA §31A-23a-406.
This section requires the entity conducting an escrow must be a title producer, which is
properly licensed, be appointed by an authorized title insurer [underwriter] and it must
issue one or more title insurance policies.
In the instant case, there were two separate transactions. Brighton Title handled
a transaction for Deseret Sky to whom it owed a duty. In order to complete the
transaction, pursuant to UCA §31A-23a-406, Brighton Title had to issue a title insurance
policy. Because Cooper was not in title, there was no way Brighton Title could issue a
title insurance policy. Therefore, as a matter of law Brighton Title could not act as the
15

escrow agent. Most significantly, because there were two separate transactions, Brighton
Title did not owe any duty to Cooper.
The statutes at issue, as well as their interpretative bulletins are prophylactic.
They are designed to prevent illegal conduct, as well as provide a sanction for engaging
in such conduct. The bulletins interpreting the statutes make clear title companies are to
be aware of and look for transactions which violate the law and to not participate therein.
This is sound public policy which is consistent with the language of the statutes. To hold
a title company liable for refusing to participate in an illegal transaction violates the clear
public policy of this state.
V
BRIGHTON TITLE WAS NOT CONTRACTUALLY BOUND BY A CONTRACT
TO WHICH IT WAS NOT A PARTY
The trial court found Brighton Title liable based on its breach of contract to
Cooper. Brighton Title was not a party to the contract between Cooper and Deseret Sky.
Cooper and Deseret Sky entered into a Real Estate Purchase Agreement. (R. 532-541).
At no time did Brighton Title sign the Real Estate Purchase Agreement nor any of the
Addendums thereto.
Brighton Title was not a party to the contract. It is only by the terms of the
contract Cooper could elect liquidated damages in the amount of the earnest money.
Because Cooper made that election under the terms of the contract, its relief pursuant to
that contract was limited to a judgment against the Deseret Sky as the only other party to
that contract.
16

VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO COOPER WHEN
IT BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY ITS AFFIRMATIVE
MISREPRESENTATION THAT IT HELD FEE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY
Cooper breached the REPC at the point of its execution and was the party first in
breach. The trial court erred in granting judgment to Cooper when it did not and never
has held fee title to the property, but nonetheless affirmatively represented it held fee
title. Because Cooper never held title to the property and was the party first in breach,
the Court erred in granting Cooper judgment as a matter of law.
Utah law is clear. "The law is well settled that a material breach by one party to
a contract excuses further performance by the non-breaching party." Holbrook v. Master
Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 1994). What constitutes a material
breach is a question of fact. Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug
Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 458 (Utah App. 1994). However, the Utah Supreme Court has
added clarity in defining a material breach, stating, "a failure of performance which
defeats the very object of the contract or [is] of such prime importance that the contract
would not have been made if default in that particular had been contemplated is a
material failure." Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). In the
instant case, the very object of the contract was the sale of real property. At no time did
Cooper own the real property. This lack of ownership was a material breach, which
excused any performance by Deseret Sky, and therefore any duty by Brighton Title.

17

VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT COOPER DID NOT
HAVE TO BE IN TITLE DURING THE EXECUTORY PERIOD WHEN
COOPER HAD NO ABILITY TO GET IN TITLE ABSENT THE FUNDS FROM
THE DESERET SKY CLOSING.
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding Cooper did not have to be in
title during the executory period, when Cooper had no independent ability to get in title
absent the funds from the Deseret Sky closing.

Because Cooper could not use Deseret

Sky's funds to close its transaction with Hansen without violating Utah law (see UCA
§31 A-23a-406), there was no evidence before the Court that Cooper could have gotten
title at during the executory period.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Cooper argued it was not required under
Utah law to be in title during the entire executory period, based on the law as set forth in
Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1981). However, the rule in Neves was qualified.
For instance, in Foxley v. Rich, 35 Utah 162, 99 P. 666 (1909), the Court ruled the
governing principle was "whether the title was beyond the control of the vendor so that
his acts amounted to a repudiation of his contract." Id. at 669-70. The Neves Court
stated
A defect which, by its nature cannot be removed by the seller as a practical matter
is one 'of such a nature that the vendor neither has title "nor in a practical sense
any prospect of acquiring it.'
Neves at 1200 citing to Davis v. Dean Vincent, Inc., 255 Or. 233, 465 P.2d 702 (1970)
and Gillmore v. Green, 39 Wn.2d 431, 235 P.2d 998 (1951). The ruling in Neves cannot
be read in isolation without considering the interplay of the now enacted provisions of the
Utah Code.
18

Cooper's argument is because it intended to use the funds received from the sale to
Deseret Sky to secure title, the holding in Neves controls. This argument is in error
because pursuant to UCA §31A-23a-406 it is now illegal to use the funds from a
subsequent sale to acquire title. Either you have independent funds to secure title or you
do not. In this case, Cooper admitted it did not. As such, Cooper neither had title nor did
it present any evidence that in a practical sense it had any prospect of acquiring title.
The evidence before the trial court was clear. It is undisputed on the date the
parties entered into the REPC, Cooper did not have fee title. (R.199-200; 511; 532-541).
It is further undisputed Cooper's purchase of the property from Hansen required Cooper
use part of the money paid by Deseret Sky to complete its acquisition of title. (R. 551552).
A close scrutiny of the undisputed facts, leads to a single conclusion. Specifically,
Cooper could not as a practical matter remove the defect, i.e. its lack of fee title, before
Deseret Sky performed by paying the money. As such, its inability to convey title
justified Deseret Sky's lack of performance. If Cooper did not have fee title, Brighton
Title, who was responsible in part for insuring the transaction and the title, could not
insure the property. Because Brighton could not insure the property, it could not act as
escrow agent. Regardless of what the contract may have stated the law states otherwise.
The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment to Cooper who
materially breached the contract excusing all performance by both Brighton Title and
Deseret Sky.
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VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING BRIGHTON TITLE
BREACHED ITS DUTY TO COOPER WHERE THE TRANSACTION WAS AN
ILLEGAL FLIP
The instant transaction was an illegal flip. Because the transaction was illegal, the
trial court erred in concluding Brighton Title breached its duty to Cooper. Because the
transaction was precluded as a matter of law, Brighton Title did not breach its duty to
Cooper by refusing to participate in the transaction. Brighton Title had no choice but to
withdraw from the transaction and refund the money on deposit to its depositor, Deseret
Sky.
A flip transaction is one in which the owner of a parcel of real property ("Seller
A") intends to sell it to a buyer ("Buyer A") who intends to immediately resell the
property to a subsequent buyer ("Buyer B"). A flip transaction may either be legal or
illegal. A legal flip transaction occurs where Buyer A brings to the table its own
independent funds and completes the purchase from Seller A in its entirety separately
from the subsequent sale to Buyer B. §31 A-23a-406, Utah Code Annotated; R590-1535; and Bulletin 2007-1. A flip transaction structured in this fashion is entirely legal.
An illegal flip transaction arises when Buyer A relies on the funds from Buyer B
to purchase the property from Seller A. §31A-23a-406, Utah Code Annotated; R590153-5; and Bulletin 2007-1. The instant transaction was an illegal flip because Cooper
was relying on the funds provided from Deseret Sky to complete the purchase of the
property from Hansen. (R. 551-552).
Because the transaction was an illegal flip, Brighton Title was specifically
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precluded from participating by both the statutes of the State of Utah as well as the
Department of Insurance interpretations of those statutes as set forth in its bulletin. The
trial court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment.
IX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING A
TITLE COMPANY MAY ACT AS AN ESCROW AGENT IN A TRANSACTION
IT CANNOT INSURE
Brighton Title acted as both an insurer and escrow agent in this transaction. The
trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that in such circumstances, Brighton
Title could act as the escrow agent in a transaction it could not insure. Pursuant to
Section 31A-23a-406, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), if a title agent cannot
issue a title insurance policy, they are prohibited by law from conducting the escrow.
Brighton Title's underwriter refused to insure the transaction because it was an illegal flip
which violated Utah law. (R. 571-573). Because Brighton Title could not insure the
transaction, it was not able to act as escrow agent on the transaction.
X
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO PROVIDE ANY ANALYSIS OR
REASONING IN GRANTING COOPER SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN
SIGNING THE RULING PREPARED BY COOPER
The trial court granted summary judgment without providing any form of grounds
for having done so. (R. 707-708). Thereafter, but only after a plethora of motions by
Brighton Title, did the trial court provide any insight into the decision it rendered. This
Court should take the opportunity to clarify the duty of the trial court in rendering
decisions on summary judgment. After the clarification, the trial court executed Cooper's
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proposed Summary Judgment which was a nearly verbatim reiteration of Cooper's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Cooper's Motion for Summary Judgment substantially
exceeded in scope and breadth the court's clarified ruling. If the Court intended to adopt
all of the facts, arguments and grounds contained in Cooper's motion, it should have
expressly done so. Otherwise, the summary judgment should have conformed to the
Court's clarifying order, not Cooper's motion for summary judgment. This Court should
instruct the bench on the scope of its duties when rendering such future summary
judgment decisions.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court. The Court erred in granting summary
judgment because there were both genuine issues of material fact and Cooper was not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As such, this Court should reverse the trial court.

Stowell Law PLLC
Attorneys for Appellant, Brighton Title
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